A long literature since Feldstein and Horioka's seminal contribution documents the strong correlation of domestic saving and investment rates since the 1960s. According to conventional wisdom, the result provides evidence of international capital market imperfections. The macroeconomic theory of small open economies prescribes a relationship between the composition of aggregate demand and its relative price structure, a linkage hitherto ignored in the saving-investment literature. Theory and evidence also suggest a rôle for growth and demographic effects, well known in previous studies. If one controls for these effects, the standard correlation of saving and investment disappears. International capital markets may be better integrated than once thought, and the former correlations may have been spurious. The pattern of domestic investment rates is better explained by domestic price distortions and other variables than by domestic saving constraints.
I. Introduction
Are international capital markets integrated? The question has profound implications for our view of the way the global economy works and how economic convergence has evolved or might yet proceed. Addressing the question "why doesn't capital flow from rich to poor countries?" Robert Lucas noted that, using a naïve Cobb-Douglas production function of the sort common to macroeconomic growth models, the marginal product of capital in India ought to be roughly 58 times that of the United States. Capital markets would have to be imperfect indeed to prevent capital flows from chasing such large profit differentials (Lucas, 1990 ). Yet empirical evidence does not fit well with theoretical prediction. Thus emerged two stylized facts of recent postwar experience that demand explanation: the small size of international capital flows and the absence of large real interest rate differentials between rich high-saving countries and poor lowsaving countries. This paper focuses on the former, a question about market integration as measured by flows, but keeps in mind its relation to the latter, a question about market integration as measured by price differentials.
The stylized facts ran counter to the conventional wisdom which asserted that capital markets had become well integrated. Martin Feldstein and Charles Horioka (FH) confounded this comfortable view with their finding that domestic investment and saving rates were highly correlated (Feldstein and Horioka, 1980) . The result focused on a strong condition for perfect capital mobility: if national saving declined, it should not necessarily "crowd out" domestic investment if the current account were able to take up the slack through capital inflows. FH investigated the coefficient B in the following regression equation:
(
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Efforts to substantiate the FH results have pursued a similar approach for a variety of sample countries using techniques to address concerns over the simultaneity issues involved and other specification problems. The result that B is significantly different from zero and, in many cases, close to unity, seems robust, implying the existence of crowding out, albeit not always one for one (Feldstein and Bacchetta, 1991) . The Feldstein-Horioka paradox-that domestic saving should appear to crowd out domestic investment in a world thought to be populated by open economies with reasonably efficient international capital markets-demanded an explanation even as it continued to "baffle the profession" (Dornbusch, 1991) .
Maurice Obstfeld (1986) marshaled theory and evidence to make a number of points in a careful critique of the FH results and their interpretation. First, inference was ill-advised without a theoretical framework, yet, reasoning with a dynamic open-economy model there were strong a priori grounds for expecting saving-investment correlations. Obstfeld chose an overlappinggenerations framework to make the point, but similar results could also be produced in a representative agent Ramsey-type model. If the economy suffers a temporary positive productivity shock then investment will respond positively and so will saving (permanent income and consumption rise, but not as much as transitory output). Second, time-series evidence, in contrast to the FH cross-section work, was weak. Third, some omitted variable might really account for the observed saving-investment correlation: for example, the rate of growth, as theory might suggest. Fourth, the coefficient B is hard to interpret without benchmarks: how small does B have to be for consistency with capital mobility? In a jolting calculation, Obstfeld unearths a telling historical perspective: time-series analysis of the classic gold standard, , for the United Kingdom, yields an estimate of B of 0.722, not significantly different from one, in a period of undisputed capital mobility. Problems of identification and interpretation thus bedevil the FH approach, notwithstanding its capacity to sharpen our focus of crowding-out issues, and we should therefore consider other tests of capital mobility using price (interest rate) data to complement the FH quantity approach. 1 Figure 1 reproduces Frankel's (1992) classification of capital mobility criteria. The strong FH condition implies real interest parity across countries, which then implies uncovered interest parity, which, in turn, implies covered interest parity, the weakest of the four conditions, and probably the only "unalloyed criterion" for capital mobility. Frankel (1991) notes that the failure of the FH condition should come as no surprise given the failure of the real interest parity condition to hold, a consequence of persistent "currency premia" (consisting of exchange risk premia and expected real depreciation) despite the absence of "country premia" (covered interest differentials The latest data from the International Comparisons Project may be usefully put to work here (Summers, et al., 1993) . I extend the FH framework in other ways. In addition to the previously observed demographic effects, I also consider the implications of transitional dynamics in a standard open-economy growth model, and I allow the interaction of growth and demographic effects prescribed by current household models of saving. I conclude that the crowding out results follow from omitted variables: common factors such as growth, demographic structure and relative prices affecting both saving and investment.
II. Theory and Methodology
As Obstfeld warned, we should consider the general theoretical context for a test of crowding out consistent with the FH approach. How can the crowding-out property be characterized? It says something about the relationship between two components of aggregate demand: I, investment;
and including effects due to growth and tax policy, and such linkages are not ruled out here (Obstfeld, 1986; Summers, 1988; Barro, Mankiw and Sala-i-Martin, 1992 ).
The econometric implications are clear yet easily overlooked: components of s and i that are driven by common variables X tell us nothing about crowding out; we must distinguish movements along the curve of F from shifts in the curve itself; we need to control for X or B will be biased. The econometric geometry in Figure 2( (Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, 58-69, 76-77) . The decentralized and command optima are equivalent, so we may focus on the latter. The problem, allowing for possible variations in the relative price structure, is 4 Fundamentally, the (somewhat obvious) point to be made is that instrumental variable techniques invoked to address simultaneity issues do not confront the omitted variable problem. In this study the variables X include the macroeconomic price structure, the demographic structure and growth performance, as discussed below. Hence, the space orthogonal to X consists of shocks to saving and investment arising from other sources-say technology, preferences or other exogenous disturbances. The question posed in this paper is whether saving and investment exhibit any correlation with respect to this restricted set of perturbations under the small-open-economy null.
(2) max
where U 0 is the utility function, c t is consumption, i t is investment, b t is debt, is the world interest rate (r*= ) and the rate of time discounting, and T is the installation cost function with the usual convexity properties. 5 Here p c and p i represent the price of (tradable) consumption and investment goods in the economy (relative to the numéraire, output). In other respects, this is the basic model. 6 Standard solution procedures for the dynamic programming problem yield the familiar results, and the details need not be repeated here. We simply reproduce the textbook solutions, adjusting for our explicit treatment of relative prices.
The standard investment problem has a solution where investment is a function of q, the shadow price of capital, equal to the discounted sum of future marginal products of investment adjusted for the relative price of investment goods:
5 As always, the interest rate and discount rate must equalize to rule out explosive paths for the country's debt.
6 It would be a straightforward generalization to allow the prices to follow a time-varying path. The assumption about the tradability of goods is not innocent, and a model which incorporates non-tradables can yield complex and non-intuitive paths for consumption, investment and the current account (Gavin, 1990) . The waters are likewise muddied in a many-goods environment (Taylor, 1991) . We maintain presently the simple form of the text for tractability, because our empirical studies will use aggregate data that do not distinguish many goods or tradables, and because even at this level of generality the introduction of a specific model adds a context for understanding the FH condition and its verification.
A rise in the relative price of investment goods lowers the profitability of a given investment measured in terms of output, lowering q. Thus investment will be negatively correlated with a shock to the price level of investment.
Consumption smoothing yields a value of consumption at all times equal to permanent consumption, itself a function of net wealth at time zero:
To convert wealth (discounted future output) into consumption goods, exchange occurs according to the relative price of consumption goods. Thus consumption will be negatively correlated with a shock to the price level of consumption. 7 The above makes no statement regarding the influence of government and the choice of public consumption (g). It may be reasonable, in a representative agent model, to treat consumption of public and private goods as one, in which case the price effects may be similar for government spending. Heuristically speaking, if the price (p g ) of government goods and services is high, agents (public or private) may seek private sector alternatives, depressing public consumption.
One last remark is in order: the proposition that relative prices relate to aggregate demand structure should be relatively insensitive to the precise theoretical specification. It would have been simple to cast the downward-sloping demand schedules for consumption and investment as a consequence of other static or dynamic models, not just the growth model approach taken here. 8
7 Of crucial importance is the fact that investment and consumption decisions are separable, given perfect capital mobility at the world interest rate , and from this follows the equivalence of command and decentralized equilibria.
In this framework, consumption (hence, saving) decisions are independent of investment decisions, and shocks to the path of one do not directly affect the other. Of course, we have seen that dynamic responses of such a system may, in fact, give appearances to the contrary. 8 Strictly speaking, the infinite horizon model relates aggregate demand structure not just to current prices p t , but rather to the entire path of future prices {p t } ∞ 0 .
Growth Rates and Transitional Dynamics
The neoclassical model eventually converges to a steady state, with consumption levels constant, investment levels declining to zero (as marginal product diminishes) and output rising to a steady-state level at an ever diminishing growth rate (associated with diminishing levels of investment and capital deepening). Figure 3 traces a typical open economy with just such transitional dynamics. The economy begins by borrowing from the rest of the world to finance investment activity in excess of domestic saving, a necessary corollary of permanent consumption levels being relatively high at that point in time. Along the transition, output rises until saving (income minus permanent consumption) exceeds investment. The country then lends capital outflows which, discounted over time, exactly offset the earlier borrowed inflows.
A methodological issue arises: where is an economy on the transition and how does this affect the saving-investment correlation? If we sampled several countries, but they all happened to be close to point B on the transition (just moving from an immature developing borrower to a mature developed lender) then, necessarily, saving and investment rates in the sample would appear closely correlated. However, this would merely be an artifact of the countries' positions on the transition path. Clearly, transitional dynamics must be controlled for in some way. 9 The growth rate provides a suitable control variable: high during early development when investment typically exceeds saving (point A), and low later on when the converse holds (point C).
Demographic Forces
The representative agent model leaves much unsaid about the impact of population heterogeneity on the composition of aggregate demand. Theory and evidence point to important linkages here, both in terms of dependency rate theories of saving and theories of population-sensitive capital formation. The literature on saving dates back to the seminal contribution of Leff, who found that saving rates were highly sensitive to age structure via the dependency rate, the share of dependents in the population, both young and old (Leff, 1969) . The qualitative point is clear enough-dependents are mostly unproductive, consuming more than they produce, and dependent on the provision of goods by productive members of the country's workforce from the complementary segment of the population. 10 The fierce debate stimulated by Leff's findings found the effect to be highly sensitive to sample and specification, and lacking in theoretical motivation, as a survey by Jeffrey Hammer makes clear (Hammer, 1986) . However, the population-saving linkage has enjoyed a renaissance with the work of Andrew Mason and Maxwell Fry on the micro-foundations of household saving behavior (Mason, 1981; Fry and Mason, 1982; Fry, 1984; Mason, 1987; Mason, 1988) . They also introduced the growth-dependency interaction, the logic of which is simple enough: in steady-state, all cohorts enjoy the same permanent income and, hence, permanent consumption; but in fast-growth conditions, young cohorts have higher permanent incomes and consumption than their elders. The relevant control variable interacts the dependency rate with the growth rate of output. Empirically, more robust findings are being produced, both in the original study by
Mason and in the recent work of Higgins that allows for a more sophisticated treatment of age structure effects following Fair and Dominguez (Fair and Dominguez, 1991; Higgins, 1992) .
Specification
Accordingly, the specification of our consumption function warrants augmentation to incorporate demographic and growth effects (both direct growth effects as above, and growth-demographic interaction terms, as here). Subject to the overarching concern about the substitutability of public and private consumption, the modifications apply to the determinants of both c and g. Thus, let 10 The result also follows from the life-cycle theory of consumption of Modigliani and others, where high income and saving in mid-life offset dis-saving when young and old (Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954; Modigliani and Ando, 1957; Ando and Modigliani, 1963; Modigliani, 1966; Modigliani and Sterling, 1983) .
where γ is the growth rate of the economy, and d represents an age-structure vector.
A similar form might easily be introduced into the investment function. Many categories of investment are population sensitive, for example, spending on housing, infrastructure and public health. Likewise, the size of the working population may reasonably be supposed to affect the derived demand for capital through its impact on the scarcity of labor. Moreover, growth effects should be admitted as a control for transitional dynamics. Accordingly, I adopt the following specification,
Exogeneity of the proposed independent variables is a vexing and delicate issue, and the choice of specification is not innocent, albeit no worse in many respects than previous choices in the literature. Even if pre-determined, the proposed independent variables may be simultaneous.
Non-tradable prices are clearly endogenous to each country in a way only multi-sector trade models could describe, requiring data beyond our ken. Demographic structure is widely acknowledged to be a function of economic development, an empirical regularity with theoretical justification. Economic growth is surely a function of investment, as well as vice versa. Such are the shortcomings of this framework, and although this approach claims methodological advances and a broader data set to support its conclusions, it has certainly not examined these issues in their fullest depth, and further research should examine the extent and importance of the endogeneity and simultaneity issues alluded to above.
III. Evidence
Data I began empirical investigation with the construction of a five-period panel data set covering 103 countries sampled using five-year averages over the period Summers, et al., 1993) . 11 Period averages have some natural appeal: (a) they abstract from shortterm business-cycle fluctuations that cannot be appropriately modeled and which are of little relevance for long-term capital movement; and (b) they overcome intrinsic averaging in the underlying data, most of which, particularly the demographic data, relies on benchmark or census observations punctuated by interpolation-since the real data do not have annual frequency, it seems unwise to proceed with estimation as if they do. 12 The sample includes the entire OECD and EC groups, and covers 22 high-income countries, 41 middle-income countries, and 27 low-income countries according to the World Bank's latest classification (The World Bank, 1993) . As is well known, the quality of the data is correlated with the level of development, and the results derived for samples including low-and middle-income countries must be interpreted with this in mind.
It suffices to say that the sample data contains no surprises-poorer countries have higher dependency rates, and relatively low saving and investment rates ( 12 For these and other reasons, the multi-year averaging approach is common in the saving-investment literature and elsewhere (Feldstein and Bacchetta, 1991; Brander and Dowrick, 1993 ).
-13 -a relationship that has been the subject of much attention in the trade and growth literature.
Presently, the data provides a means to assess the FH criterion anew. The study departs from the previous literature by using an expanded panel data-set to: (a) control for price structures, demographic effects and growth as suggested by theory; (b) increase our range of country observations; and (c) track the evolution of international capital markets over time.
Determinants of Aggregate Demand
The data are used to implement estimations of the determinants of real aggregate demand shares, according to the functional forms of equations (5) and (6). Appropriately, the shares of private consumption (CC), investment (CI) and public consumption (CG) evaluated at current international prices are the dependent variables in the regressions shown in Table 1 . Explanatory variables include the growth rate of the economy (G), the age-structure measured by a three- Standard panel estimation procedures were followed, allowing for random effects, fixed effects or no effects (OLS) by individual (country). In every case, specification tests overwhelmingly favored random effects, but similar results were obtained with fixed effects. The panel data approach follows Brander and Dowrick (1993) , who also seem to favor a random effects model in a similar panel study. In every case, F-tests found the demographic variables to be highly significant, a pleasant confirmation of the extensive analysis of Higgins (1992). In almost every case (except consumption in middle-and low-income samples and in Africa and Asia), relative price effects were negative and highly significant, offering strong support for the theoretical arguments motivating their inclusion. Relative price effects on investment and growth have been examined elsewhere, in early empirical work by Agarwala for The World Bank, and recently in the resurgent literature on investment, price distortions and economic growth provoked by the novel findings of Barro, De Long and Summers (Agarwala, 1983; The World Bank, 1983; Barro, 1991; De Long and Summers, 1991; De Long, 1992; Jones, 1992; Taylor, 1992; Brander and Dowrick, 1993) .
Some discussion of the estimated coefficients is in order. The empirical findings mesh with the predictions of the theory for the most part, but in the case of samples including large numbers of countries with recognized poor data quality in PWT (such as those on the right of proportionate decreases in D1 and D3, raises the investment rate by between one half and one percentage point (twice the coefficient of D2). 15 The coefficient of D1 appears positive for more developed countries, and negative otherwise, which would be consistent with the view that population-sensitive categories of investment such as housing, public health and infrastructure are less significant outside the developed countries.
For public consumption, the model provides less powerful explanations (R-squared statistics are lower), but elements of the same forces that drive private consumption are manifested here: a strong growth-dependency interaction in the developed countries, and strong direct dependency-effects in some of the developing countries. Relative price effects are uniformly strong with a semi-elasticity of around -0.05.
With the above econometric models in hand, we now turn to the main question posed in this paper: does consumption crowd out investment as the Feldstein-Horioka tests have formerly suggested, or do common external factors better explain the raw correlation of investment rates and saving rates?
15 The labor-supply effect was noted by Brander and Dowrick (1993) , with strong implications for long-run growth.
Higgins (1992) also found a similar effect. The price effect was also noted by Brander and Dowrick (and others). It will be concluded later that such a price effect might explain a good deal of the cross-sectional saving-investment correlations in the current literature. For the present, then, we should note that the price effect estimated in this paper is not unusually large-only as large and significant as that found in many other studies of investment determinants.
Is Investment Saving-Constrained?
At issue is the exogeneity issue described in Figure 2 . We know that saving and investment correlations have been found to be present in many samples, even controlling for certain simultaneity and exogeneity problems. We now ask whether the story holds true for a wider set of samples and in the presence of controls. We want to know the coefficient B=∂s/∂i| X , a measure of how much saving crowds out investment once we control for determinants X common to both saving and investment. That is, we should ask whether the unexplained residual components of the aggregate-demand regressions in Table 1 reveal any tendency for consumption to crowd out investment.
As anticipated, a pricing problem arises. The Penn World Table is a system of real national accounts (SRNA), but the saving-investment correlation is a property of nominal variables valued at domestic prices-does $10 of saving augment investment by $10?-and hence should be based on data from a conventional system of national accounts (SNA). Summers and Heston (1991) are the first to point to the dangers of using PWT data inappropriately for questions such as these. Nonetheless, it is easy enough to extract SNA data from the SRNA data in PWT-one must simply adjust country aggregate demand components for relative price levels to convert from international prices to domestic prices. 16 Accordingly, I report the correlation coefficient ′ (properly interpreted as minus B, the standard FH coefficient) for duly priceadjusted consumption and investment shares, according to the following regression run on the domestic-valued residuals:
The striking results, which appear to overturn the conventional story about the FH test, appear in Table 2 . In almost all cases the coefficient is much smaller than previous estimates, being far from close to unity: the case that crowding out might be less than one for one can surely be made. Furthermore, the time path of the coefficient, although fluctuating, follows a distinct downward trend over much of the sample period, at least for the more-developed (betterdata) samples on the left side of the table (columns 1-5). Indeed, by period's end the coefficient is not significantly different from zero for the developed countries. Capital markets may be said to have become more integrated over time, arguably reaching a point now where savinginvestment correlations have all but disappeared, with close-to-zero crowding out for highincome economies, the OECD and the EC. For low-and middle-income economies, the savinginvestment correlations are still significant (though less than one for one) and, until the late eighties, had shown a dramatic decline-subject to concerns regarding the quality of our underlying data for these samples.
I conclude that conventional determinants of consumption and investment (evident in Figure 4 ) play an important rôle in determining the allocation of resources for consumption and investment uses, and that the co-movement of investment and consumption which arises plays an important part in the widely observed saving-investment correlations, rather than pure crowding out. Poorer countries tend to have high child dependency rates and low relative prices of consumption compared to rich countries, effects which account for higher consumption rates, hence lower saving rates. Poorer countries also tend to have lower labor supply from the population share of working age and high relative prices of investment compared to rich countries, effects which account for their low investment rates. In tandem, these influences explain no small part of the observed raw saving-investment correlations.
IV. Context and Implications of the Results

Sources of Price Distortions
This study made extensive use of relative price effects to account for aggregate demand patterns.
The existence of price dispersion across countries has been well known for some time, and dates back to early work on purchasing power parity by Balassa, Kravis and others. 17 That price distortions may account for differing levels of investment (and, hence, economic growth) has also been discussed elsewhere (Agarwala, 1983; The World Bank, 1983; Barro, 1991; De Long and Summers, 1991; De Long, 1992; Jones, 1992; Taylor, 1992; Brander and Dowrick, 1993 ).
An actual country experience proves instructive. Until recently, Argentina had one of the most distorted price structures in the world, a legacy of reactive policy choices in the Great Depression, codified under Péron to produce bread-and-circuses (cheap consumption goods) for the working masses (his base of popular support), and to encourage import substitution using multiple exchange rates and exchange rationing for low-priority capital-goods imports (expensive investment goods, particularly equipment and machinery). The available data presented by Díaz-Alejandro (1970) documents the spectacular price twists that ensued-for example, machines costing two or three times as much as in the United States. Although an extreme case, the Argentine example illustrates some not atypical developing-country policy choices. The problem amounted not only to a perpetual static distortion of prices, encouraging rent-seeking and misallocation, but also to a dynamic distortion.
17 The Penn World Table had its genesis in the work of Kravis and others on national price levels. Balassa marshalled theory and evidence to expalin how price levels systematically vary across rich and poor countries in terms of relative productivity in non-tradables (Balassa, 1964; Kravis and Lipsey, 1982) .
Why Capital Doesn't Flow from Rich to Poor Countries
The results thus offer an alternate explanation of the puzzling stylized fact that so little capital flows from rich to poor countries. Lucas, having established the absurd differences in marginal productivity implied by a crude Cobb-Douglas production function, went on to discuss other explanations including the possibility of international capital market failures and the omission of other factors that enhance productivity levels in developed countries, notably human capital (Lucas, 1990) . Gregory Clark interpreted differing productivity levels across countries to be a manifestation of fundamentally different inherent labor productivity (Clark, 1987) . Deepak Lal explored the possibility of differences in the efficiency of capital across countries, and found that, for a small sample of countries, there may be very little dispersion in the marginal product of capital. Lal suggested that there may be no conundrum at all once the profitability of investments in different countries is taken into account. In that case, we have no reason to expect large capital flows-there are no rate of return differentials to be arbitraged away (Lal, 1991) .
In this sense, the present study is most closely linked to the ongoing work of Matthew Higgins (1993). Like Lal, he is concerned with correctly measuring the profitability of investments, and he takes seriously the importance of the relative price of investment. The holding return on capital in any country is inversely correlated with the relative price of investment (analogous to our expression for q earlier). The Higgins formula for the priceadjusted marginal product of capital is:
Taking measurements, after Lucas, of the marginal product of capital corrected for relative prices he derives the holding returns, the dispersions of which are remarkably small; indeed, they appear lower for some developing countries than for the United States. For example, Kenya's MPK at international prices is apparently about 36%, but at domestic prices falls to about 17%, well below the U.S. value of 24%.
The Argentine example makes the idea concrete: with a relative price of capital more than twice the United States level, holding returns on Argentine capital would be less than half the United States level at the same level of productivity. What Higgins and Lal assert for rate-ofreturn criteria, the present study asserts for flow criteria, addressing the other angle of the capital mobility debate in Figure 1 , the FH condition: controlling for relative price effects, saving and investment show comparatively little cross-country correlation.
Implications for Growth and Convergence
Price distortions lower economic growth, or so theory and evidence seem to suggest. The linkage is quite straightforward: a higher price of investment goods is just like a tax on investment. 18 Investment is a powerful determinant of economic growth (Dowrick and Nguyen, 1989; Barro, 1991) . When productivity depends on capital intensity, such disincentives to capital formation will lower growth rates. The linkage appears particularly strong for equipment and machinery, the more tradable categories of capital goods (De Long and Summers, 1991; De Long, 1992) .
The Argentine experience is again a canonical example: the pricing of investment goods was associated with very low levels of real investment measured at international prices (although very high measured at domestic prices, of course), which depressed capital deepening and, hence, retarded economic growth-perhaps accounting for the greater part of Argentina's retardation relative to the OECD (Taylor, 1992) . Similar stories about policy-induced price distortions may be told about India (De Long and Summers, 1991; Jones, 1992) and, likely, many other developing countries. 19 In fact, investment prices coupled with demographically 18 The linkage was established in independent work by Jones and Taylor. The former focused on a single-period study 1960-85 for a cross-section of countries, with special reference to tax policy in India. The latter involved a panel data study 1960-85 with special reference to Argentine economic retardation (Jones, 1992; Taylor, 1992) .
19 Both Argentina and India ranked middling to high on The World Bank's crude measure of price distortions in the 1970's (The World Bank, 1983, 62).
induced labor-supply effects, as here, offer an attractive model of capital formation and economic growth (Brander and Dowrick, 1993) .
Capital Market Integration
What do the results say about the general trend in world capital-market integration in recent postwar experience? Figure 5 offers a graphical interpretation of the path of the FH coefficient for some of our subsamples. Overall, the high-income economies seem to have a greater degree of capital market integration (less crowding out), as one might have expected. For the OECD, HIINC and MIDINC samples, a peak in 1970-75 is evident, suggestive of disintegration tendencies in the wake of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the ensuing confusion in international financial markets. National policy responses to the first oil shock may also have played a part in generating an autarkic tendency in capital markets. Both events could be associated with a structural shift in the system due to, say, perceived increases in the risks associated with international lending.
All the same, a general decline in the coefficient is evident through the early 1980s, heralding the return of integrative forces, forces powerful enough to reduce the coefficient to insignificant levels for the EC12, the OECD and the HIINC samples by the end of the decade.
Poorer countries, although sharing the same trend, experienced an abrupt reversal in the latter half of the 1980s, a disintegration experience again almost certainly associated with unrest in international financial markets-in this case, the onset of the debt crisis. Although rising interest rates and exploding debt burdens were evident in the early 1980s, a series of defaults and renegotiations alleviated the need for heavily indebted developing countries to take immediate steps to redress their external (and internal) imbalance problems. A plethora of rescheduling in 1984 -85 (The World Bank, 1985 was followed by the harsh impositions of World Bank and IMF conditionality in the late-1980s. The political viability of the reforms depended on the emergence of liberal-minded governments. In this way, the immediate sanctions on the debtor countries did not really bite until several years after the deluge, and in the short run, indeed, external imbalance (that is, the disparity between domestic saving and investment) often widened as help from anxious banks and aid agencies made bridging loans and grace periods available, generating continued capital inflows. Only time will tell if the end-of-period peaks in the middleincome and (especially) the low-income coefficients are merely transitory blips on a continuing integration trend, or a more permanent disintegrative shock to world capital markets.
This paper has extended the saving-investment literature by investigating the determinants of the aggregate demand structure in a post-WWII panel data set covering over one hundred low-, middle-and high-income countries. The empirical findings mesh with theory, and show powerful price, demographic and growth effects in the demand functions for private and public consumption and investment. Such effects, in their magnitude and direction, are consistent with, and give confirmation to, earlier studies of investment and saving alone. Here the aggregate demand determinants are used to explore the possibility that common variables might explain the puzzling cross-section saving-investment phenomenon known as the Feldstein-Horioka paradox, a result somewhat at odds with evidence more favorable to capital-market integration seen in time-series saving-investment studies and in studies of price (interest rate) criteria.
The main contribution of the paper is to show that the Feldstein-Horoika correlation, so often replicated, might be an artifact of omitted variable bias, since a common set of variables does influence national saving and investment rates, and sufficiently so to explain much of the correlation. In this framework, international capital markets do exhibit a recent tendency toward increased integration over time. The high-income economies may already have achieved a degree of integration where crowding out is negligible, a strong criterion for capital mobility (Figures 1, 5) . The result contradicts saving-investment correlations in the raw data because account has been taken of powerful exogenous determinants common to consumption and investment-relative prices, growth and demographic structure-that vary systematically across countries. For Obstfeld (1986, (94) (95) , the puzzle was how to square the Feldstein-Horioka paradox with interest rate criteria that supported the capital mobility view, and to reconcile conflicting evidence on the saving-investment correlations from time-series and cross-section studies. Perhaps, given the present results, we should not be baffled by these earlier findings:
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